

JANUARY 1965

trans.
Affairs

V. CHERNYAVSKY

U.S. Intelligence and the Monopolies

NOT so long ago, the term "intelligence community" would often crop up in Western press reports about U.S. intelligence and espionage, whereas today such expressions as "intelligence industry" or "intelligence business" are more popular. And there are very good reasons for this change in nomenclature.

"The Central Intelligence Agency operates prudently and in a businesslike manner as a factory or, to be more exact, as a big corporation. It is a big establishment like General Motors, United States Steel, Standard Oil Company, etc.," the West German commentator, Joachim Joesten, wrote a few years ago. He arrived at this conclusion because, first, "most of the CIA leading personnel come from the American business world" and, second, the methods of Central Intelligence "in fact repeat those of a corporation".¹

Other students of U.S. intelligence have also remarked on these features of the CIA. "A branch of industry" is the choice of terms of Stewart Alsop, an expert on the U.S. secret service.

This applies to other American intelligence bodies, including the numerous military intelligence organisations and the special secret service of the FBI.

SOURCE OF CONTRACTS FOR THE ARMS MONOPOLIES

JUST like every important branch of industry, the "intelligence business" controls an enormous amount of capital. And although no information about the U.S. intelligence service's assets has ever been published, it can, on the basis of approximate and indirect data, be safely assumed that the American "intelligence corporation" is second only to the Pentagon, whose assets are estimated at \$165,000 million. This is three times above the assets of such

giants as General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, United States Steel, American Telephone and Telegraph Company and Metropolitan Life Insurance combined. The Pentagon's annual budget amounts to the huge sum of \$55,000 million.

The budget of the entire U.S. intelligence service is also enormous. In the early 1950s, L. Farago, U.S. intelligence expert, wrote that \$2,000 million to \$3,000 million were spent on it annually. Julius Mader, G.D.R. journalist, believes that by 1960 this spending had doubled to between \$4,000 million to \$6,000 million.

Newsweek wrote in 1960 that the United States spent about \$3,000 million a year on intelligence. In their book, *The Invisible Government*, published in 1964, David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, well-informed American journalists, note that expenditure on U.S. intelligence amounts to \$4,000 million annually.

These figures, however, are hardly complete. A. Tully, yet another expert on Washington's secret service, while analysing the financial aspect of U.S. Central Intelligence activity, emphasises that "even in Congress, those legislators who pass on CIA appropriations often are unaware when they vote on funds for other government departments that these actually are a part of CIA's budget, concealed for security purposes".²

The large sums spent on military intelligence are camouflaged under the numerous headings of the Pentagon budget. The same can be said of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration budget, which in fiscal 1964/65 is \$5,300 million. It is no secret that a considerable part of this money goes to cover intelligence needs, ranging from the U-2 flights for "meteorological" purposes to the launching of "sky spies", artificial earth satellites equipped with photographic, electronic and other devices intended to locate atomic factories, rocket-

¹ J. Joesten, *CIA—Wie der amerikanische Geheimdienst arbeitet?*, München, 1958, S. 20.

² Andrew Tully, *CIA. The Inside Story*, New York, 1962, p. 15.